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Abstract
We are concerned with evolutionary algorithms that are employed for economic model-
ing purposes. We focus in particular on evolutionary algorithms that use a binary encoding
of strategies. These algorithms, commonly referred to as genetic algorithms, are popular in
agent-based computational economics research. In many studies, however, there is no clear
reason for the use of a binary encoding of strategies. We therefore examine to what extent
the use of such an encoding may influence the results produced by an evolutionary algo-
rithm. It turns out that the use of a binary encoding can have quite significant effects. Since
these effects do not have a meaningful economic interpretation, they should be regarded as
artifacts. Our findings indicate that in general the use of a binary encoding is undesirable.
They also highlight the importance of employing evolutionary algorithms with a sensible
economic interpretation.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are algorithms that are inspired by the process of natural evolu-
tion. EAs have their origins in the field of computer science, where they are mainly applied for
optimization purposes. Nowadays, EAs are also regularly employed in the field of economics.
In economic research, EAs frequently serve as a tool for modeling boundedly rational behavior.
When EAs are applied as a modeling tool in economic research, a binary encoding of strategies
is typically used. This means that strategies are represented by bit strings (i.e., strings of zeros
and ones) and that evolutionarily inspired operations such as crossover and mutation take place
at the level of individual bits. EAs that use a binary encoding of strategies are commonly re-
ferred to as genetic algorithms. For early research in which genetic algorithms are employed, we
refer to Miller (1986, 1996), Axelrod (1987), Marks (1992), Arifovic (1994, 1996), Andreoni
and Miller (1995), and Dawid (1996). Examples of more recent research can be found in the
work of, among others, Lux and Schornstein (2005), Alkemade, La Poutre´, and Amman (2006,
2007, 2009), Arifovic and Maschek (2006), Wheeler, Bean, Gaffney, and Taylor (2006), Xu
(2006), and Casari (2008).
Researchers who apply genetic algorithms as a tool for modeling boundedly rational behav-
ior typically do not justify why they use a binary encoding of strategies. If the agents whose
behavior is being modeled have to make decisions that are intrinsically binary, such as decisions
between cooperation and defection in a prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., Axelrod, 1987), the use of a
binary encoding of strategies is a very natural choice. However, in the case of non-binary de-
cisions, such as decisions by firms on their production level (e.g., Arifovic, 1994; Price, 1997;
Dawid & Kopel, 1998; Franke, 1998; Vriend, 2000; Alkemade et al., 2006, 2007, 2009; Ari-
fovic & Maschek, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2006; Casari, 2008), there is no clear reason for the use
of a binary encoding of strategies.
In this paper, we examine to what extent the use of a binary encoding of strategies may
influence the results of studies in which EAs are employed. It turns out that the use of a binary
encoding can have quite significant effects. In general, these effects do not have a meaningful
economic interpretation and should be regarded as artifacts. In order to avoid these artifacts, we
argue that in most cases researchers should not use a binary encoding of strategies.
Our research is inspired by results reported by Alkemade et al. (2006, 2007, 2009) (see
also Waltman & Van Eck, 2009b). Alkemade et al. show that under certain conditions an EA
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that is employed for modeling purposes may exhibit premature convergence. By premature
convergence Alkemade et al. mean that different runs of the EA can lead to very different
results. Alkemade et al. argue that premature convergence is caused by a too small population
size. In this paper, we report results that point in a different direction. We show that the
observation of premature convergence by Alkemade et al. depends crucially on their use of a
binary encoding of strategies. Using the same economic environment as Alkemade et al. (i.e., a
Cournot oligopoly market), we demonstrate that premature convergence does occur in the case
of EAs with a binary encoding while it does not occur in the case of EAs without a binary
encoding. These results indicate that the premature convergence observed by Alkemade et al.
is an artifact caused by the use of a binary encoding of strategies.
We note that the consequences of the use of a binary encoding of strategies are also studied
extensively by Dawid (1996) (see also Dawid & Kopel, 1998). However, the approach taken
by Dawid is quite different from the approach that we take in the present paper. Dawid focuses
on EAs with a large population size, and he is concerned with aggregate results, that is, results
averaged over many EA runs. We do not assume the population size to be large, and we are
specifically interested in comparing results of individual EA runs. Another difference is that the
crossover operator plays a crucial role in Dawid’s approach while in our approach the crossover
operator is not important at all.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we discuss the
Cournot market that we consider in this paper and we present the various EAs that we study. In
Section 4, we report the results of the computer simulations that we have performed. Based on
the results, we provide an elaborate analysis of the effect of a binary encoding of strategies in
Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the conclusions of our research.
2 Cournot oligopoly market
To analyze the effect of a binary encoding of strategies, we study the behavior of firms in a
Cournot oligopoly market. We consider exactly the same Cournot market as Alkemade et al.
(2006, 2007, 2009). For other studies in which quantity competition among firms is modeled
using EAs, we refer to Arifovic (1994), Price (1997), Dawid and Kopel (1998), Franke (1998),
Vriend (2000), Arifovic and Maschek (2006), Riechmann (2006), Wheeler et al. (2006), and
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Casari (2008).
The Cournot market that we consider has the following characteristics: The number of firms
equals four, firms produce perfect substitutes, the demand function is linear, firms have identical
cost functions, and marginal cost is constant. The inverse demand function is given by
p = max
(
256−
4∑
i=1
qi, 0
)
, (1)
where p denotes the market price and qi denotes firm i’s production level. Firm i’s total cost
equals ci = 56qi. Hence, it follows that firm i’s profit is given by
pii = pqi − ci = qimax
(
200−
4∑
i′=1
qi′ ,−56
)
. (2)
A Nash (or Cournot) equilibrium is obtained if each firm chooses a production level that max-
imizes its profit given the production levels of its competitors. This means that in a Nash
equilibrium ∂pii/∂qi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4. It is easy to see that the Cournot market that we
consider has a Nash equilibrium in which each firm produces a quantity of 40. Each firm makes
a profit of 1600 in the Nash equilibrium. In addition to a Nash equilibrium, the Cournot market
that we consider also has a competitive (or Walrasian) equilibrium. This equilibrium is obtained
if firms are not aware of their influence on the market price and therefore behave as price takers.
In the competitive equilibrium, the four firms jointly produce a quantity of 200 and each firm
makes a profit of 0.
3 Evolutionary algorithms
As pointed out by Vriend (2000), there are two quite different ways in which EAs can be
employed to model the behavior of economic agents. In the individual learning approach, each
agent learns exclusively from its own experience (e.g., Arifovic, 1994; Price, 1997; Arifovic
& Maschek, 2006; Casari, 2008). This is modeled through the use of a separate EA for each
agent. In the social learning approach, each agent learns not only from its own experience but
also from the experience of other agents (e.g., Arifovic, 1994; Dawid & Kopel, 1998; Franke,
1998; Alkemade et al., 2006, 2007, 2009; Riechmann, 2006). This is modeled through the use
of a single EA for all agents together. The social learning approach seems to be more popular
than the individual learning approach (Arifovic & Maschek, 2006). In this paper, we focus our
attention on the social learning approach.
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An important observation about the social learning approach is made by Alkemade et al.
(2006, 2007, 2009). They note that the social learning approach can be implemented in two
quite different ways. On the one hand, one can employ an EA with a population size that equals
the number of interacting agents (e.g., Arifovic, 1994; Dawid & Kopel, 1998; Franke, 1998;
Vriend, 2000; Riechmann, 2006). This results in a one-to-one relationship between strategies
and agents. In the case of the Cournot oligopoly market discussed in the previous section, the
EA would have a population size of four (since there are four firms in the market). On the other
hand, one can employ an EA with a population size that exceeds the number of interacting
agents (e.g., Axelrod, 1987; Andreoni & Miller, 1995; Miller, 1996; Dawid, 1996, Sections 4.5
and 5.3). Strategies are then evaluated using some matching mechanism. In the case of the
Cournot oligopoly market discussed in the previous section, the EA would have a population
size greater than four. Alkemade et al. show that the two ways in which the social learning
approach can be implemented can lead to very different results.1 In this paper, we only employ
EAs with a population size that equals the number of interacting agents. We take this approach
because it turns out to be very suitable for demonstrating how the use of a binary encoding of
strategies can lead to artifacts.
We consider five different EAs in this paper. We refer to these EAs as EA1 to EA5. Each
of the EAs provides a slightly different model of the behavior of firms in the Cournot market
discussed in the previous section. The five EAs all have the same general form. This general
form is shown in Figure 1. Each EA makes use of a population of four strategies. A strategy
corresponds with the production level of one of the four firms in the Cournot market. The
EAs all impose the constraint that the production level of a firm must lie between 0 and 127,
and they all randomly generate an initial population by drawing four strategies from a uniform
distribution over all possible strategies. In each iteration of an EA, the profit resulting from each
of the four strategies in the current population is calculated using (2). Based on the profits of
the four strategies, the fitness values of the strategies are calculated according to
fi =
max
(
pii−µ
σ
+ 2, 0
)
if σ > 0,
1 otherwise,
(3)
1In the evolutionary game theory literature, similar observations have been made by various researchers, for ex-
ample by Hansen and Samuelson (1988) and Rhode and Stegeman (1996) in an economic context and by Schaffer
(1988) in a biological context.
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Randomly generate an initial population of strategies
repeat
Calculate each strategy’s profit
Calculate each strategy’s fitness
Apply the selection operator
Apply the crossover and mutation operators
until a specific number of iterations have been performed
Figure 1: General form of the five EAs considered in this paper.
where µ and σ denote, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the profits of the
strategies, that is,
µ =
∑4
i=1 pii
4
, (4)
σ =
√∑4
i=1 (pii − µ)2
4
. (5)
The above transformation from profits to fitness values is sometimes referred to as sigma scaling
(e.g., Mitchell, 1996) or sigma truncation (e.g., Goldberg, 1989). The transformation is used by,
for example, Axelrod (1987), Andreoni and Miller (1995), Miller (1996), and Franke (1998).
The five EAs that we study all use roulette wheel selection (e.g., Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell,
1996), also known as fitness-proportionate selection. This means that in each iteration of an
EA the selection operator generates a new population of strategies by randomly drawing four
strategies from the old population. Strategies are drawn independently and with replacement.
The probability that a strategy is drawn is proportional to the fitness of the strategy given by (3).
The five EAs that we consider differ from each other on the following four dimensions:
1. The type of strategies that are used, that is, integer production levels or real-valued pro-
duction levels.
2. Whether a binary encoding of strategies is used or not.
3. Whether a crossover operator is used or not.
4. The type of mutation operator that is used.
The differences between the EAs are summarized in Table 1. We now discuss the specific
characteristics of each of the EAs.
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Table 1: Overview of the differences between the five EAs considered in this paper.
EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5
Strategy integer integer integer integer real number
Binary encoding yes yes no no no
Crossover yes no no no no
Mutation bit flip bit flip uniform dist. plus/minus 1 normal dist.
3.1 EA1
EA1 is a standard genetic algorithm (e.g., Goldberg, 1989; Mitchell, 1996). It uses integer
production levels and a binary encoding of strategies. A strategy is represented by a bit string of
length seven. The production level corresponding to a bit string (b1, . . . , b7), where bj ∈ {0, 1}
denotes the value of the jth bit in the string, is given by
q =
7∑
j=1
27−jbj. (6)
EA1 uses a single-point crossover operator (e.g., Mitchell, 1996) with a crossover rate of 1.
The mutation operator used by EA1 randomly determines for each bit in a bit string whether
the bit should be inverted or not. The mutation rate equals 0.001, which means that each bit has
a probability of 0.001 of being inverted. We note that EA1 is very similar to the EA employed
by Alkemade et al. (2006, 2007, 2009).
3.2 EA2
EA2 is identical to EA1 except that it does not use a crossover operator.
3.3 EA3
Like EA2, EA3 uses integer production levels and does not use a crossover operator. Unlike
EA2, EA3 does not use a binary encoding of strategies. EA3 also uses a different mutation
operator than EA2. The probability that a strategy is being mutated equals 0.01. If a strategy is
being mutated, it is replaced by a random new strategy that is drawn from a uniform distribution
over all possible strategies. In the economic literature, EAs similar to EA3 are employed by
U¨nver (2001), Dawid and Dermietzel (2006), and Haruvy, Roth, and U¨nver (2006).
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3.4 EA4
EA4 is identical to EA3 except that it uses a different mutation operator. The probability that a
strategy is being mutated equals 0.01. If a strategy is being mutated, the corresponding produc-
tion level is either increased by one or decreased by one (both with a probability of 0.5). The
increase or decrease does not take place if the resulting new production level would be below 0
or above 127.
3.5 EA5
Like EA3 and EA4, EA5 does not use a binary encoding of strategies and also does not use
a crossover operator. Unlike EA3 and EA4, EA5 uses real-valued production levels. EA5
also uses a different mutation operator than EA3 and EA4. The probability that a strategy is
being mutated equals 0.01. If a strategy is being mutated, the corresponding production level is
updated according to
qnew = min
(
max
(
qold +N
(
0, s2
)
, 0
)
, 127
)
, (7)
where qold denotes the production level before mutation, qnew denotes the production level after
mutation, and N(0, s2) denotes a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation s. EA5 uses a value of 1 for the parameter s. We note that EA5 is somewhat
similar to what is referred to as an evolution strategy in the computer science literature (e.g.,
Beyer, 2001; Beyer & Schwefel, 2002). In the economic literature, EAs similar to EA5 are
employed by Sellgren (2001), Gerding, Van Bragt, and La Poutre´ (2003), Lux and Schornstein
(2005), Clemens and Riechmann (2006), and Riechmann (2006).
4 Simulation results
In this section, we report the results of the computer simulations that we have performed.2 Each
of the five EAs discussed in the previous section was run 100 times, each time using different
random numbers. Each run lasted 10 000 iterations. We note that the results reported below
are fairly robust to changes in the values of the various EA parameters. By changing parameter
2The software used to obtain the results is available online at http://www.ludowaltman.nl/
binaryencoding/. The software runs in MATLAB.
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values, somewhat different results may be obtained, but the analysis will remain essentially
unchanged. The results reported below are also robust to changes in the transformation from
profits to fitness values. We further experimented with simulation runs that lasted one million
instead of 10 000 iterations, but this also did not affect the analysis in any fundamental way.
The results of six selected runs of EA1 are shown in Figure 2. Each graph in the figure
corresponds with one run of EA1. The graphs display how the average production level of the
four firms in the market evolves over time. In the graphs in panels (a), (b), and (c), firms’
average production level stabilizes fairly quickly, respectively at a quantity of 47, 50, and 64.
These results are quite typical. In almost all 100 runs of EA1, we observe that firms’ average
production level stabilizes at one of these three quantities. However, firms’ average production
level does not always remain stabilized at the same quantity during an entire run. In a few
runs of EA1, we find that firms’ average production level switches from one stable quantity to
another. Panels (d), (e), and (f) of Figure 2 provide examples of such runs.
In panel (a) of Figure 3, the results of all 100 runs of EA1 are averaged. As can be seen, on
average firms’ production level stabilizes at a quantity of about 52. Based on the 100 runs of
EA1, the distribution of firms’ average production level at the end of a run can be determined.
This distribution is displayed in panel (b) of Figure 3. It turns out that in somewhat more than
half of the runs firms’ average production level after 10 000 iterations equals the stable quantity
of 50. In most other runs, firms’ average production level after 10 000 iterations equals either the
stable quantity of 47 or the stable quantity of 64. There are a few runs in which firms’ average
production level after 10 000 iterations does not equal one of the three stable quantities. In most
of these runs, this is probably due to small disturbances caused by the mutation operator.
The results that we have obtained using EA1 are very similar to the results reported by
Alkemade et al. (2006, 2007, 2009).3 Like Alkemade et al., we find that in different EA runs
firms’ average production level stabilizes at different quantities. This phenomenon is referred to
as premature convergence by Alkemade et al.. We further find that on average firms’ production
level stabilizes at a quantity above 50. This means that on average firms produce a larger
quantity than in the competitive equilibrium of the Cournot oligopoly market (see Section 2).
This finding is also in agreement with the results reported by Alkemade et al.
3Due to an error in their computer simulations, the results reported by Alkemade et al. (2006, 2007) are not
entirely correct. For a correction of the results, see Alkemade et al. (2009). For some additional comments on the
results, see Waltman and Van Eck (2009b).
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Figure 2: Results of six selected runs of EA1. The graphs display for each run how firms’
average production level evolves over time. The horizontal line in each graph indicates the
competitive equilibrium quantity of 50.
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Figure 3: Results of EA1 to EA5. The graphs in the left panels display for each EA how firms’
average production level evolves over time. The results shown in the graphs are averages over
100 EA runs. Error bars indicate standard deviations. The horizontal line in each graph indicates
the competitive equilibrium quantity of 50. The histograms in the right panels display for each
EA the distribution of firms’ average production level at the end of a run. The distributions are
based on 100 EA runs.
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We now turn to EA2. The results obtained using EA2 are shown in panels (c) and (d) of
Figure 3. It is clear that the results of EA2 are quite similar to the results of EA1. Like EA1,
EA2 leads to premature convergence. Firms’ average production level again stabilizes at a
quantity of 47, 50, or 64. The similarity between the results of EA1 and EA2 is not surprising.
The only difference between the two EAs is that EA1 uses a crossover operator while EA2 does
not use such an operator. In an earlier paper (Waltman & Van Eck, 2009a), we have shown
mathematically that, if the mutation rate is small and some technical assumptions are satisfied,
the effect of the use of a crossover operator on the results produced by an EA tends to be
negligible in the long run. The results shown in Figure 3 are in line with this theoretical finding.
Finally, we consider EA3, EA4, and EA5. The results obtained using these EAs are shown
in panels (e) to (j) of Figure 3. As can be seen, in the long run the three EAs produce quite
similar results. The only noteworthy difference is that the results of EA3 are more volatile than
the results of EA4 and EA5. However, this is to be expected, since EA3 uses a more disruptive
mutation operator than EA4 and EA5 (see Section 3). What is much more interesting to look
at is the difference between the results of EA3, EA4, and EA5 on the one hand and the results
of EA1 and EA2 on the other hand. When looking at the aggregate results of 100 EA runs (see
the left panels of Figure 3), it can be seen that firms’ average production level stabilizes at a
quantity of 50 in the case of EA3, EA4, and EA5 while it stabilizes at a quantity of about 52 in
the case of EA1 and EA2. Hence, in the case of EA3, EA4, and EA5, firms on average produce
the quantity associated with the competitive equilibrium of the Cournot market (see Section 2).
In the case of EA1 and EA2, on the other hand, firms on average produce a quantity that is
larger than the competitive equilibrium quantity. When looking at the results of individual EA
runs (see the right panels of Figure 3), it turns out that firms’ average production level stabilizes
around a quantity of 50 in the case of EA3, EA4, and EA5 while it stabilizes at a quantity of
47, 50, or 64 in the case of EA1 and EA2. Hence, premature convergence only takes place in
the case of EA1 and EA2. It does not take place in the case of EA3, EA4, and EA5. Based on
the above observations, it is clear that, both at the aggregate level and at the level of individual
runs, EA3, EA4, and EA5 produce fundamentally different results than EA1 and EA2.
The principal difference between EA1 and EA2 on the one hand and EA3, EA4, and EA5
on the other hand is that EA1 and EA2 use a binary encoding of strategies while EA3, EA4, and
EA5 do not use such an encoding (see Table 1). Based on the results reported in this section,
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it seems that the use of a binary encoding of strategies can have quite significant effects. In
the next section, we provide an analysis of these effects, in particular of the phenomenon of
premature convergence.
5 Analysis of the effect of a binary encoding of strategies
For each of the five EAs considered in the previous section, it turned out that in at least a
substantial number of runs firms’ average production level stabilized at a quantity of 50, that
is, at the quantity associated with the competitive equilibrium of the Cournot oligopoly market.
There is a straightforward explanation for this finding. Suppose that in some iteration of an EA
the population consists of four identical strategies, each corresponding with a production level
of 50. The market price then equals firms’ constant marginal cost, and each strategy therefore
results in a profit of 0. Suppose now that the mutation operator changes one of the strategies in
the population. We refer to this strategy as strategy A. Strategy A’s production level may either
increase or decrease. If strategy A’s production level increases, the total quantity produced in
the market will increase and, as a consequence, the market price will fall below firms’ constant
marginal cost. All four strategies in the population will then result in a loss, but strategy A will
result in a larger loss than the other strategies. If on the other hand strategy A’s production level
decreases, the total quantity produced in the market will decrease and, as a consequence, the
market price will rise above firms’ constant marginal cost. All four strategies in the population
will then result in a profit, but strategy A will result in a smaller profit than the other strategies.
Hence, regardless of whether strategy A’s production level increases or decreases, the fitness
of strategy A will always be lower than the fitness of the other strategies in the population. As
a consequence, the probability that in the next iterations of the EA strategy A remains in the
population is quite low. Most likely, within one or a few iterations, the selection operator will
remove strategy A from the population. The population will then return to its original state, that
is, it will again consist of four identical strategies, each corresponding with a production level
of 50.
The above mechanism explains why in the EAs considered in the previous section firms’ av-
erage production level tends to stabilize at the competitive equilibrium quantity of 50. It should
be noted that the above mechanism has been discussed quite extensively in the evolutionary
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game theory literature. The mechanism was first discussed by Hansen and Samuelson (1988)
and Schaffer (1989), and a comprehensive mathematical treatment of the mechanism was pro-
vided by Vega-Redondo (1997). A discussion of the mechanism can also be found in a study
by Vriend (2000) on EA modeling in a Cournot oligopoly environment.
As discussed in the previous section, the fundamental difference between the results ob-
tained using EA1 and EA2 on the one hand and the results obtained using EA3, EA4, and
EA5 on the other hand is that in the case of EA1 and EA2 firms’ average production level can
stabilize not only at a quantity of 50 but also at a quantity of 47 or 64. This phenomenon of
multiple stable quantities is referred to as premature convergence by Alkemade et al. (2006,
2007, 2009). We now show that the premature convergence phenomenon is caused by the use
of a binary encoding of strategies.
Suppose that in some iteration of EA1 or EA2 the population consists of four identical
strategies, each corresponding with a production level of 47. Each strategy is then represented
by the bit string 0101111. Suppose now that out of the 28 bits used to represent the four strate-
gies in the population exactly one bit is inverted by the mutation operator. This means that
after applying the mutation operator one of the four strategies in the population has changed
while the other three strategies have not changed. We refer to the strategy that has changed as
strategy A. The first column of Table 2 lists seven bit strings. It is clear that one of these bit
strings must represent strategy A (which one depends on which bit has been inverted). For each
bit string, the corresponding production level is listed in the second column of the table. The
last two columns of the table list for each production level the resulting profit of strategy A as
well as the resulting profit of the other three strategies in the population, that is, the strategies
corresponding with a production level of 47. Profits were calculated using (1) and (2). As can
be seen in the table, the profit of strategy A will always be smaller than the profit of the other
three strategies, regardless of which bit has been inverted. This means that within one or a few
iterations of the EA the selection operator will most likely remove strategy A from the popu-
lation. The population will then return to its original state, that is, it will again consist of four
identical strategies, each corresponding with a production level of 47.
In the case of EA1 and EA2, the above mechanism shows that, if the population is in a state
in which each strategy corresponds with a production level of 47, the inversion of a single bit
is unlikely to upset this state for more than a few iterations. Of course, things may be different
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Table 2: Effect of the inversion of a single bit given a population in which each strategy corre-
sponds with a production level of 47 (represented by the bit string 0101111).
Bit string Production level Profit strategy A Profit other
strategy A strategy A strategies
0101110 46 598 611
0101101 45 630 658
0101011 43 688 752
0100111 39 780 940
0111111 63 −252 −188
0001111 15 660 2068
1101111 111 −5772 −2444
when the mutation operator inverts two or more bits at the same time. However, this happens
only very rarely. (Given a mutation rate of 0.001, this happens on average once in every 2692
iterations of an EA.) The above mechanism therefore explains why in the case of EA1 and EA2
firms’ average production level can stabilize at a quantity of 47.
The same explanation also holds for a quantity of 64. This quantity corresponds with the
bit string 1000000. The bit strings that can be obtained by inverting a single bit are listed in
the first column of Table 3. This table has a similar structure as Table 2. Like in Table 2, the
profits listed in the third column of Table 3 are always smaller than those listed in the fourth
column. This indicates that, if the population is in a state in which each strategy corresponds
with a production level of 64, the inversion of a single bit is unlikely to upset this state for more
than a few iterations. Taking into account that the simultaneous inversion of two or more bits
happens only very rarely, this explains why 64 is a stable quantity in the case of EA1 and EA2.
A question that remains is whether in the case of EA1 and EA2 there are other stable quan-
tities in addition to 47, 50, and 64. To answer this question, we calculated tables similar to
Tables 2 and 3 for all integer quantities between 0 and 127. It turned out that 47, 50, and 64
are the only quantities for which the inversion of a single bit always results in a smaller profit
for the mutated strategy than for the three non-mutated strategies. 47, 50, and 64 are therefore
the only stable quantities. All other quantities are unstable. Consider for example Table 4. This
table was calculated for a quantity of 48. As can be seen in the table, the inversion of one of
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Table 3: Effect of the inversion of a single bit given a population in which each strategy corre-
sponds with a production level of 64 (represented by the bit string 1000000).
Bit string Production level Profit strategy A Profit other
strategy A strategy A strategies
1000001 65 −3640 −3584
1000010 66 −3696 −3584
1000100 68 −3808 −3584
1001000 72 −4032 −3584
1010000 80 −4480 −3584
1100000 96 −5376 −3584
0000000 0 0 512
the three rightmost bits results in a larger profit for the mutated strategy (referred to as strategy
A in the table) than for the three non-mutated strategies. This indicates that, given a population
in which each strategy corresponds with a production level of 48, the inversion of a single bit
can relatively easily trigger a transition to a completely different population. This makes 48 an
unstable quantity.
We have now shown how the use of a binary encoding of strategies causes the premature
convergence observed in the case of EA1 and EA2. Based on our analysis, it is clear that the
phenomenon of premature convergence depends crucially on the use of a binary encoding of
strategies. We note that our analysis is perfectly in line with the simulation results reported
in the previous section. The analysis not only explains why premature convergence occurs
specifically in the case of EA1 and EA2, but it also explains why the quantities of 47, 50, and
64 are stable and all other quantities are unstable. In this way, the analysis provides a good
understanding of the most important results shown in Figures 2 and 3.
6 Conclusions
In a paper on EA modeling, Dawid and Kopel (1998) warn that “we have to be aware of the
fact that simulation results may crucially depend on implementation details which have hardly
any economic meaning” (p. 311). The present paper can be seen as an illustration of this im-
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Table 4: Effect of the inversion of a single bit given a population in which each strategy corre-
sponds with a production level of 48 (represented by the bit string 0110000).
Bit string Production level Profit strategy A Profit other
strategy A strategy A strategies
0110001 49 343 336
0110010 50 300 288
0110100 52 208 192
0111000 56 0 0
0100000 32 768 1152
0010000 16 640 1920
1110000 112 −6272 −2688
portant but somewhat overlooked point. In the context of quantity competition among firms, it
is difficult if not impossible to give a sensible economic interpretation to the use of a binary en-
coding of strategies. In fact, the use of a binary encoding seems merely a relic from the genetic
algorithm literature in the field of computer science. Of course, nothing would be wrong with
the use of a binary encoding if its effect on the results produced by an EA were insignificant.
However, our computer simulations and the subsequent analysis make clear that this need not
be the case. They show that the use of a binary encoding may lead to a phenomenon known
as premature convergence. This phenomenon is an artifact that depends crucially on strategies
being encoded in binary form.
Based on our findings, we conclude that in general the use of a binary encoding of strategies
is undesirable. By not using a binary encoding, one avoids the risk of having to deal with all
kinds of artifacts, such as the premature convergence observed by Alkemade et al. (2006, 2007,
2009). For various examples of studies in which EAs are employed without using a binary
encoding, we refer to Sellgren (2001), U¨nver (2001), Gerding et al. (2003), Lux and Schornstein
(2005), Clemens and Riechmann (2006), Dawid and Dermietzel (2006), Haruvy et al. (2006),
and Riechmann (2006). It should be noted, however, that there are special cases in which
we consider the use of a binary encoding perfectly acceptable. In a prisoner’s dilemma, for
example, agents have to make decisions that are intrinsically binary, namely decisions between
cooperation and defection. The use of a binary encoding of strategies (e.g., Axelrod, 1987) then
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seems a very natural choice that is unlikely to cause any artifacts.
The more general point that we want to make is that, when one employs an EA for eco-
nomic modeling, all elements of the EA should have a meaningful economic interpretation
(see also Dawid & Dermietzel, 2006).4 Many EAs employed in economic research have been
adopted from the computer science literature without any substantial modification. Such EAs
are likely to contain elements of which the economic interpretation is unclear. The use of a
binary encoding of strategies is an example of such an element. Other EA elements of which
the economic interpretation requires special attention include the population size (Alkemade et
al., 2006, 2007, 2009), the selection operator (Van Bragt, Van Kemenade, & La Poutre´, 2001;
Dawid & Dermietzel, 2006), and the strategy updating regime (Dawid & Dermietzel, 2006).
As we have shown in this paper, EA elements without a sensible economic interpretation may
lead to simulation results that lack a sound underlying economic rationale. To avoid such re-
sults, paying close attention to the economic interpretation of the various elements of an EA is
absolutely essential.
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